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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an a;pp'eaJl from rthe appellant's conviic't:Jion of
second degree arson and of being an h:aJbiituaJl orimi:nail.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'Dhe appellanlt was oonvioted by a jury in the District
Cour:t of Cache County, Utah, Criminal No. 15'26, of second
degI'lee arson and was ailsio found to be an !haJbilbuaJl criminal
by lthe 1same jury. The appellant was sentenced ooncurrently on 'boitJh counts oo serve a term of ndt
'than fifteen years as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 ( 1953).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this court to affirm appeUant's convictJion and hdld thalt no errors were commi:t!ted by the rt:rlia;l
judge.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees wi1th the Statement of F,acts as
set ourt by the appellant. It
be noted, however, thalt
in agreeing with these facts the respondent does nort agree
Wti'th the contentis of the affidavit submitted with rt!he change
of venue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF VENUE.
The respondent
that appellant has not ,carried
his burden of showing that any publioity denied him a fafr
and impa11tfral 1trilaJl. There it.S no transcript of
the jury, and the respondent oannot kn01w if any publricity
Furthermore, the appe'.1affeoted the jul'ors'
lant has not
how the
could have oaused
'the itri'al to be unfair. 'There iis no connection made between
the alleged unfofr publicity 1and the 'a11legation that the
1could not have a fair trial. It has n!Olt been shown
that an impartial jury was n'ot ca:lled or itJhait 1impane'.lling
one wrus not po819ible. Wiilthout this showing,
appellant
has not sustained his burden 1of showing that the rtria1 court
'erred in denying 1tJhe change of v;enue.
Utah Gode Ann. § 77-26-1 (1953) allows 1a 'Change of
venue whenever it can be shown 1:ha:t "a faJir and impaDtial
rbriaJl oanndt be had 1in the county where the action 1is pend-

---ing." This statute requires the defendant to show that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had. Without this shoiwing there is no grnund for a change of venue in a criminal
action. Again it is .subrrii t'ted that the defendant did nolt
or has not now met his burden as required by this statute.
The judge was correct in deny;ing the motion for a change
of venue.
1

It is well isettled in Utah thait it lies within :t'he oound
discretion of ithe trial court to deltermine whether a clrange
of venue should be .gmnted on the ground :that a fa;ir and
impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the
offense had been commitJted. State v. BeBee, 110 Utah
484, 175 P. 2d 478 (1946); State v. Carrington, 15 Utah
480, 50 Pac. 526 (1897); State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40
P. 2d 961 (1935).
This Court wiH not disturb the decision of the triaJl
court unless an albuse of discretion is shown. State v. BediscreB ee, supra. The appe1'lant has ,s1hown no aibuse
on the par t of the trial court.
1

In State v. Green, supra, th!iis Court ruled that where

it is evident that there was no difficulty rin securing a jury,
and even !though many of the jurors had read or heard
sometJhing •concerning the case a1bout to be tried, the !trial
court' s refusaJl 1Jo change venue was not 1in error. Nothing
has been shown by the appellant Ito lead :this court ito beltihait t!here was any difficulty in securing a jury.
1

1

Also in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P. 2d
297 (1969), the defendant made a motion for a oonrtJinu-
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anoe on the ground 1;hat the pre-trial publicity, which contained references that the defendants were parolees, wa'3
excessive and, as a result, a fair itriia:l
not be
The Utaih oourt ruled that the publicilty did Il!ot prevent a
fair trfaJI or "so infected the minds of the jurors as to
l eave them biased agiainsit defendants." Id. at 239, 461 P.
2d aJt 302. Tlhere was no error in 1Jhe ·court ref using the
continuance. See also: State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358
P. 2d 342 (1961).
1

The appellant cites Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S.
333 ( 1965) and related Supreme Courtt cases for the propoSjJtJion thaJt the
of the dircumstances raises the
prdbaJbHity of prejudice. The appeHant lhas failed 1Jo show
even a reasonaJble
of prejudice. In Sinclair v.
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P. 2d 305 (1967), this Court
helld that the fact that jurors may have become aware of
puvpWted f.a:cts of a case through publicity does not disqualli:fy !them :If they swear rimpar!tiailly. In Sinclair, the
Utah Court noted Sheppard and Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S.
532 ( 1965) , and distingu1ished them on !their facts as being
signi:f.1icantly diifrerenrt situations. In light of the fact that
ithere is no showing :tJhat the jury was or couM have been
!influenced by the pre--triail publicity in fuis case, !the ruring
denyiing the mo'tJion for ch1ange of venue shouM be affirmed.
hrus been shown which could require :this court to
hold thaJt the tria!l court abused iit:.s discretion lin denying
1Jhe motion for change of venue, i.'e., no showing of abuse
of that discretion, and no showing of even a reasonable
likeHhood of prejudice.
1

1
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PHOTOGRAPHS
OF THE BURNED BUILDING AND FURNITURE DAMAGED BY THE FIRE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-2 (1953) defines second degree
arson as follolws :
"Any person who wilfu}lly and maliciously sets
frire to or burns or causes to be burned any . . •
pulJJ.ic bui!lding . . . is gud!l!ty of arson liil ithe second
degree and shall be senrtenood itJo the staite p:riison
for not les1s than one nor more than ten years."
The State must prove, and did rin fact prove, that :bhe appellant wilfully and mrulrk:iiously set fire
the c11ime 11ab
of 1Jhe Cache County Jail. The evidence is ample and supports the jury"g verdict of gudilty.
1

'Dhe photographs and damaged fumiiture
show that
a f[,re was !selt in 1:Jhe c11ime lab. They have probative value
to show a direct element of second degree arson, ii.e., a
fiiire was set. The 1information reads that !t!he appellant did
Hwilfully and ma:Ticiously set fire to and burn !the Cache
County J aiil, a public building" (R. 9). (Emphas,is added.)
The information acttual'ly requires more than the second
degree arson statute. The word "and" is used in ithe informaitfon whd!le "or" i5 used in the statute. This informa1Jiron did plwce the defendant on notice that evidence would
be introduced to show 1tJhat a fire had been set and that the
buiMing wa:s burned. By using "and" in the rinformation,
the prosecution p'laced upon itself the burden of proving
1

6

two 'elemenrts, i.e., (1)
fire to, and (2) burn a public
building. All of the evidence challenged by
is
relevant to both elements. It show,s !that there was in
fact a fire, and indirectly, that the building 1was burned.
AH of this demonsrtrative evidence and all the photographs
were
by other itesrtimony to the effect thart
'!Jhe f1ire was severe 'enough to damage furniture, f1ixtures
and 'buiiding
Boith Officer C:rockett 1and John
Martinez saw :filames coming from the vent in the door (T.
10; 67). Capfain Miller ffi the Cache County Fire Department testified that when he arrived on the scene :the :ti1e
was "smouldering and afire" (T. 78). AH the witnesses
were shown 'the plhotographs and other emiibits, and their
testimonies substanitiate 'tlhe priobative value of the eviidence
challenged herein.
1

In State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P. 2d 392
of photo( 1968) , the Utah Court held thart 1the
graphs
largely in the discrelbron of the trial court and
ordin1ariily his di1s cretion wi:ll nort be disturbed. Tihere is
no rubuse of discretion in this case. The probative value
any prejudice that might resuJit. Furljjhermore, 'the appellant has failed to show what possible
prejudice might result by the pictures being admi tted. He
had been put on no'tlice 1Jhat evidence showing thart a fire
hrud been set would be presented. The :only prejudice !Which
coulid resU:llt
thaJt the jury wou1ld believe
the 3!ppel'lant did in fact start a fire. Such "prejudice" i 1s not reversi:ble error.
1
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POINT III.
THE E V I D E NC E SUBMITTED BY THE
STATE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE
ELEMENTS OF SECOND DEGREE ARSON.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY.
The elements of second degree arson arc (1) a person
(a defendant) did (2) wHfully and maliciously (3) set
fire to or burn a building ·a.s enumerated in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-'2 ( 1953). The testimony presented by :the
pmsecutJiion did show that the appellant wais near the door
when the fire started (T. 9), •and thait the appellant kicked
out the vent with the back iof h'is foot ( T. 65), bent over
and stuck hiis arm th11ough the louvern (T. 66). Immediately af!ter flames were seen coming out f11om these louvers
(T. 67). Matches we11e found on the •appellant filter the
above took place (T. 13). Thi•s evidence is sufficient 1to
p11ove the fii:rst element thait lbhe appelanrt; set fire to rthe
crime lab room and attempted to set fire to the building.
It also supports the second element that the act was wilful
and maHcious. The testimony ru'led out accident or mistake.
5 ( E) sets forth i:Jhe prom required Ibo prove
the lbblird elemeillt. I1t says :
"A buHding :within the meaning of these iin·S'tmcitfoms means any part of the permanent structure or any part 3JtJtached to the lbuli'lding so that it
is an integraJl part of the bui:lding such as plum'bing, heating, and lighting fixtures. This does not
1
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include personal property suoh as chairs, tables,
desks, or curtains that arie unattached by some fixed
mebhod suc!h as i.screws, nai ls, glue, or some method
distinguishes i1t from a temporary
where it is moved from the
the occupiers
of the builMing move from it" (R. 46). (Emphasis
added.)
1

In all the pho11Jographs admi'tted into evidence there is
·evidence ibh'alt the integrail part oif the bu[1ding was burned.
Thi1s is true even though irrcluded in the phdtograph:s are
1piciures of movables whiich were burned by itJhe fire. The
prolba1Jive vailue oif these phofographs 'and the furniture ris
discui.ssed in Point II. It !Ls sufficient here to say that tbhe
.third eilement, as set {)ut in the information, 'Was proved.
The evidence suvported the charge that the
did
set flire :to and burn a publtic building. The evidence submitted proved th:at a fire was started and the buliilding was
burned.
The trial oou:rrt did not err in submitting fue case 'bo
the jury. 'I'he evildence wa;s su!fficient Ito prove the elements
of isecond degree arson and the judge properly submitted
the cruse to 'the jury.
1

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLANT HAD
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN A PRIOR CASE ON WHICH THE
HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUS lS BASED.

The Utah Supreme Court has rnied 1in Oivil No. 12051
that the appel!lantt herein did waJi.ve his righ't 'to counsel in
Case No. 1058. 'Dhe appellant had filed a writ of error
with 'the Utah Supreme Court. This writ was denied April
6, 1970. The petition di<d mise the issue of whether the
appellant did
his right to counseL Based up()IIl tthis
fact aJlone, th:ere i s sufficient 1baisis for concluding tha't :the
'triall courit did not err in basing ,fue hiabiltua!l criminail sitatus
upon this priror conviiction. 'Dhe minute en'try, which 'is parit
of this record on appeal, does state that appellant d[d in
fact waJive hiis righit to counsel. Since n!o transcript was
made part oif tile record, 1Jhis Coum must
on ithe minute
entry, and the minute entry supports the trial cou11t's ru1<ing. State v.
9 Ariz. App. 265, 451 P. 2d 623
( 1969).
1

Furthermore, Mnce art the lflime of .the trial the appellant had nOlt exercised a proper remedy to se't aside the
previous conviction, the haJbituail criminal sfutus was 1mpooed in accordan:ce wi:th Utaih Code Ann. §§ 76-1-18, and
-19 (19'53). The Uta!h Rules of Civil ·Procedure outline
remedies Whi:c'h were avaJi.laJble fo the
Nothing
had been done to chaJl'lenge the previous conViCbion, and ithe
triaJl court could not set a:side the prior oonviotiit>n.
1

1

The case of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967) is
ndt contI'o'1ling in this case. There ithe prior conVlicmon was
presumed <to be void on its face. The conviction read in
palt, "Came the Assistant Attorney Gene:rial for the Sita'te
and the Defendant in proper person ·and without counsel."
There was no 1indiication a't aJH in the record tha't counsei
1
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had been waived. In this case, however, the minute entry
does indicate thait counse'l had been waived, and there is
was void on ri,tJs
no presumptfon that the prior
face. State v. Jefferson, 204 Ifan. 50, 460 P. 2d 610 (1969).
Furthermore, Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909 (D.
C. Utah 1968), turns upon ithe point that the defendant in
fact was neither afforded nor did he waive counse[ 'in the
prior proceedings. Such is no't the case here. The appellant has not met his burden of showing fillat counse'l wais
in fact not waived. State v. Yurk, 203 Kan. 629, 456 P. 2d
11 ( 1969). AppeUamJt had the burden of sho1wing an irregu'lari'ty in the prior conviic'tion. Since this burden was not
met, the presumptilOn of regularity as eVidenced by the
minute entry must sfand.
1

1

POINT V.
THE VERDICT RE'TURNED ON THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUS IS NOT VOID ON
ITS FACE.
It is true ,that in Utah the !habitual crrimina1l status
does not create a crime. Being an hwbitual crimina:l is a
sitrutus, ,and 'to be charged with being an hahitua[ c11iminail
i s not to be charged with a crime. Zeimer v. Turner, 14
Utah 2d 232, 381 P. 2d 721 (1963); State v. Wood, 2 Utah
2d 34, 268 P. 2d 998 (1954).
1

Even though the aibove iiis true, the procedure is to
"charge" the defendant with being an lh:abi1tua1 crrimina'l.
Utalh Code Ann. § 76-1-19 (1953). The information contains the aUegaitrons of the prior convictions and charges

11
one W'i'th being an habitual crimina:l. The defendant is ailso
tried by a jury on 'tJhe issue of whether or not he has had
two prior felony conviotions. If the jury finds that a defendant has been twice previously convicted of felonies,
then in a technicaJl sense, .that defendant has been "convfoted" of being an hwbitual crimiJ11al. Utah Code Ann. §
77-1-11 (1953). Upon such finding the defendant is pun,iished by imprisonment in the state p:rison for noit less than
fifteen years. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953). In Utah
the place of incarceration determines the dlifferenoe between a felony and a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §
76--1-13 (1953). So, in the technical sense one being "convicted" of being an haJbitual crriminal has been convicted
of a "fe'1ony," since he has been sentenced to the state
prison. This iB itrue even though being an habitual criminal
is a status.
1

1

This being the case, then, the verdict returned by the
jury 1is not void on i't!S face !but is technicaily correct. lit
reads: "We the jury, duly .impanelled and sworn, find the
defendant gui'lty of being an habitUJal criminal, a fe'lony,
as charged in the information" ( R. 50) . This says nothing
about the haJbiituaJl criminwl status being a crime.
1

The appellant claims that use of the words "a felony"
confused the jury and created a misunderstanding as to
what wa:s required of the jury. There is no showing, ho1wever, as .to whaJt the confusion could p-0ssibly be. The jury
did ndt and cannot impose the penalty. Their duty is
to try the issue of the two p:r'ior convictions. There
is no way that the verdict form could confuse this issue.
1
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EV'en if the verdict is defective, 1it is a mere technfoailrity
and no showing of pr.ej udice has ibeen made.
"After hearing on appeaJl ithe court must give
judgment without regard to error.s or defects which
do not affedt the sulbstantial rights of the parties."
* * * UtaJh Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953).
An error, if committed, should m:>t be presumed to
have resulted in prejudice. The appeHant must show that
prejudice resulted. from the error. Aibsen't fuis shomng,
this court is ndt warranted in reversing the judgment.
State v. Neil, 1 Ufah 2d 1'22, 262 P. 2d 756 (1953). No
Showing has been maide in this ca&e, and tJhe respondent
sutbmits that none can be shown.
1

POINT VI.
THE LOWER OOURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING CONCURRENT 1SE'NTENCES ON THE
APPELLANT WHO WAS CONVICTED OF
SECOND DEGRE·E ARSON AND OF BEING
AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL.
If an addirtiionaJl sen'tlence had been imposed on top of
the senteJllce for iseoond degree arson, fuen thi s Court may
lbe warnanted in finding thait the trial court erred. But
where, as here, the sentences <were 'imposed concurrentJly,
no prejudice resulted ito the alppe11ant. The effect is that
he has been sentenced to serve the penalty prescribed !in
the haJbritua:l c11imina:l statute, i.e., imprisoJllment in lthe sitate
prison for not less than fifteen years. Again the Court
must giive judgment wifuout regard to errorn not affecting
1

13

the rights of the appeHant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953).
The effect of the habiltual criminal status is to increase
the punrishment for .the conviction of the rtJh!ird offense.
Zeimer V. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232, 381 P. 2d 271 (1963).
l:ts 'invocation does nm inflict additional punishment, and
even iJhough the judge imposed 'separate sentences, there
was no prej
error since the intent of lthe lrabi'tua;l
criminal ·sllatute w'as met.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the t:rii. al court did not
commit iany errors whlich would
a reversal of !the
oonvicitJilon below. Tihe State asks that .the judgment be
affirmed.
1

RespectfuUy submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
A1Jtx>rney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Alfillorney General
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